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LANDMINE CLEARANCE TEST FACILITY WTD 51
 
 Koblenz: 09.08.2002  
Summary Report 
 Planned object: Mechanical mine clearance device  
 
 Identification Nr: 2350-14390  
 
 Manufacturer: Fa. FFG                                 
 
 Model: MINEBREAKER 2000/2              
 
 Project - Nr.: E/K43A/20601/Q5204  
 
 Task: Clearing of life AT-mines (explosive up to 7,0 kg TNT) through 
the use of MINEBREAKER 2002 in the test area of the Military 
Technical Centre (WTD 91) in Meppen. Carrying out of 
acceleration measurements at the driver seat and execution of 
acoustic measurements. 
Determination of the repair costs after the mine detonation.      
      
      
 
 
 Report:     Pages: 59 Photos: 77 Tables: 15  
 
 Author: TRAR Theimer Department: 230 Phone: 19 73  
 
 Main Outcome: The MINEBREAKER system cleared the following AT-mines: three DM 
21, one TM 62 and one TM 57. The driver is sufficiently protected in the 
vibration proof driver cabin (up to 7 kg TNT) as far as the mines explode 
inside the tiller’s working area. The measured figures are below the limits 
set for mine-protected vehicles. After each explosion the vehicle was 
checked for damages and repaired if needed. The damages that occurred 
during the trials can be assessed as small. 
      
 
   
 (Signature)  
 Remarks:        Translation into English:                                      M. Garotta 
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                                                                      FIST BWB               1x
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1 Task definition  
The army requires a mine clearance device that is able to clear in a fast and safe way 
known minefields or areas suspected as mine-affected, in environments requested to be 
used as water treatment areas, airfields, and camps. 
For operation in Afghanistan a MINEBREAKER from FFG Cie. was procured. 
This mine clearance device was tested in a trial in June 2001 by WTD 51, whereby its 
clearance efficiency (and safety) had been proved (see report WTD 51 of 23.01.2002). 
These trials took place in clayey and sandy soil, using inert and blast surrogate mines. 
The device had already cleared mines operationally in Croatia, Bosnia and Korea, 
though the effects of mine detonations had not been documented sufficiently. Hence the 
WTD51 was tasked to evaluate the effect of AT-mine detonation during clearing on the 
vehicle and its operator.   
In principle, the following tasks shall be conducted: 
 Participation in a detailed theoretical and practical instruction on the vehicle. 
 Assignment to WTD 91 for the preparation of the terrain and the provision of a 
sufficient number of life AT-mines. 
 Assignment to WTD 41 for the comparative assessment during the clearance 
process with the military mine clearance vehicle Keiler. 
 Execution of acoustic measurements inside the driver cabin. 
 Execution of acceleration measurements on the ground and on the driver seat 
inside the driver cabin. 
 Determination of the physical and psychological effects on the driver. 
 Determination of the damages to the vehicle.  
 Assessment of the repair costs and efforts. 
 Assessment of the effects on the ongoing clearance process after AT-mine 
detonation. 
 Evaluation of the results and assessment of the damages to the vehicle. 
2 Test fields and time frame of the trial 
Test fields:   WTD 91, Meppen 
Time frame:  Trial preparation up to  05.07.2002 
    Instruction on vehicle 08.07. to 12.07.2002 




3 Brief description of the MINEBREAKER 2000/2 
The mine clearance device MINEBREAKER is based on a modified Leopard 1 chassis, 
a hydraulically-powered rotating drum, mounted at the front of the vehicle, and an 
armoured driver cabin. Due to its modular design, the tiller unit of the Minebreaker can 
be fitted to other prime movers. The vehicle is powered by a 610 kW diesel engine of 
MTU Cie. 
The tiller unit is composed of a tilling drum with steel teeth of Wolfram-Carbide. 
The device has a clearance depth capacity of up to 50 cm, either detonating or 




Manufacturer:  Fa. Flensburger Fahrzeugbau Gesellschaft mbH  
   Werftstraße 24 
   24905 Flensburg 
 
4 Execution of the trials 
4.1  Instruction 
On the basis of the operating instructions of the MINEBREAKER 2000/2 (edition 
September 2000) the operating staff, consisting of personnel from BWB KG IV 3, WTD 
51, WTD 41, WTD 91 and from the Army Engineer School, were trained practically and 
theoretically on the mine clearance device and the mine clearing process. 
During the instruction, a discussion was held with all staff about safety during the 
operation of the mine clearance device in areas with life AT-mines. This discussion was 
managed by the Security Department of WTD 91 and resulted in the permission to 
conduct the trials. 
During the instruction, blast surrogate mines (with an initiating charge of about 100 to 
200 g black powder in the original cases) were used. 
 
4.2 Clearance of life AT-mines 
The clearance of life AT-mines with the MINEBREAKER is only allowed to be carried 
out by instructed personnel, and requires specific technical experience of the vehicle, as 
well as good knowledge about the safety regulations described in the operating manual.  
During the trials, the following security distances had to be kept: 
  Operating without mines: about 10 m from the external sides of the vehicle 
Operating with mines: about 1000 m from the external sides of the vehicle 
     (Personnel in protected area e.g. bunker)   
After the instructions about the MINEBREAKER given to the personnel tasked to clear 
the AT-mines, the trials were conducted as follows: 
 Positioning of the MINEBREAKER, engine remains switched on; driver sits in the 
protected driver cabin.  
 Installation and switching on of the measurement instruments (acceleration and 
acoustic measurements). 
 Switching on of the armoured video camera inside the driver cabin.  
 Placement and activation of AT-mines (by experts). The mines were buried 5 cm 
deep, positioned in the centre of the tiller drums and about 10 m away from the 
MINEBREAKER. All staff was positioned in the protected area. 
 Checking of the radio connection between the driver and the control station.  
 Starting of the tilling process after commanding by the control station. 
 The speed of movement was fixed between 3 and 6 m/min.  
 The clearance depth was up to 30 cm. 
 After detonation of the mine or initiation of the mine fuse, the driver was instructed 
to stop the vehicle, to lift the tiller drum from the ground and stop it rotating.  
 After proving the safety by an expert, the measurement instruments and the 
cameras were stopped. 
 Determination of the repair costs and damages to the vehicle. 
 
After each detonation of an AT-mine, the measurement results were checked and 
evaluated. Furthermore, after each mine cleared,  the damage, including repair costs,,  
was assessed. 
The WTD 91, Department 360, allocated the following AT-mines:  
DM 21 with about 4,5 kg explosive aluminium mine case 
TM 62 P3 with about 7,0 kg explosive plastic mine case 
TM 57 with about 6,5 kg explosive steel mine case 
 
See report of WTD 91     Annex 1 and  




The following persons were instructed on the MINEBREAKER: 
Mr. Reutter,   Army FSH/BauT 
Mr. Gewald,   Army FSH/BauT 
Mr. Sponfeldner,  Army FSH/BauT 
Mr. Kronjäger,   BWB – KG IV 3 
Mr. Lang,    WTD 41 – 320 
Mr. Leszke,    WTD 91 – 360 
Mr. Kölzer,    WTD 51 – 230 
Mr. Kirfel,    WTD 51 – 110 
Mr. Theimer,   WTD 51 – 230 
 
Everybody who took part in the instruction process received an instruction manual. 
On top of the instruction manual a brief instruction document was created, which is 
attached as Annex 2. The latter document is only valid when used together with the 
instruction manual mentioned before. 
Cie. FFG issued certificates for the above mentioned personnel, giving them permission 
to operate and run the vehicle. 
 
5.2 Clearance of life AT-mines 







Position of  
detonation 
1 15.07.02 DM 21 Mr. KasischkeFa. FFG yes
Right side of
tiller drum 
2 16.07.02 DM 21 Mr. KirfelWTD 51 yes
Centre of 
 tiller drum 
3 16.07.02 DM 21 Mr. GewaldPiS yes
Centre of  
 of tiller drum 




5 18.07.02 TM 62 P3 Mr ReutterPiS
Explosive tilled 
Fuse initiated 
Centre of the 
 tiller drum 
6 18.07.02 TM 62 P3 Mr SponfeldnerPiS
Explosive tilled 
 Fuse detonated
Centre of the 
 tiller drum 
7 18.07.02 TM 62 P3 Mr SponfeldnerPiS
Explosive tilled 
 Fuse detonated
Centre of the 
 tiller drum 
8 19.07.02 TM 62 P3 Mr TheimerWTD 51
Explosive tilled 
 Fuse detonated
Centre of the  
tiller drum 
 
9 19.07.02 TM 57 Mr KölzerWTD 51 yes
 Left side of  
the tiller drum  
 
5.3 Damages to the mine clearance device 
 
Damages after trial 1, see Annex 4 photo 29 
(Detonation of AT-mines DM 21) 
Damages Repairs see photo
Right side plate, tiller end and side plate
3mm Niro right,  bent 
No 4
  
Left side plate, tiller end and side plate




T-beam with tiller chisel holders, fully 




3 chisels melted 3 chisels replaced 7
Screw connections pipe support, short, and,




Middle rubber cover  
and the rubber holder loosened and bent
 







Damages after trial 2 see annex 4 photo 30 
(Detonation AT-mines DM 21) 
 
Damage Repairs see photo
No  
  




One T-beam bent upwards No  
 
 
Pipes bent upwards No  
 
10
Screw connections pipe support, short, 
and pipe fixing, short, ripped off. Sealed 
connections ripped 
Connection re-established through 
seal 
11 and 12
Right rubber cover ripped off on the left, 
left rubber holder ripped 
Rubber and rubber holder replaced  13
Middle rubber cover ripped out of 
clamping plate, support bent 
Rubber cover mechanically straitened, 
rubber cover refastened 
14
Left rubber cover out of position, left 
rubber support slightly bent  
Rubber cover positioned
15
One chisel melted  One chisel replaced  
Monitor cover in the driver cabin  
detached 
Cover refastened  
Right side plate, tiller end and side plate
3mm Niro right, bent more 
Left side plate, tiller end and side plate
3mm Niro right, bent more 
T-beam with tiller chisel holders, fully 






Damages after trial 3 see annex 4 photo 31 
(Detonation of AT-mines DM 21) 
   
Damage Repairs see photo 
Right side plate, tiller end and side plate
3 mm Niro right, bent more 
 
No   
  
Left side plate, tiller end and side plate 
3 mm Niro right, bent more 
 
No   
T-beam with tiller chisel holders, 




One T-beam bent upwards Replaced
 
 
Pipes bent upwards or ripped off Replaced
 
17
Screw connections pipe support, short, 
and pipe fixing, short, ripped off. 
Sealed connections ripped 
Replaced  
Right rubber cover ripped off on the left, 
left rubber holder ripped 
Rubber clamping plate and
rubber holder replaced 
 
Middle rubber cover ripped out of 
clamping plate 
Rubber clamping plate and 
rubber holder replaced 
 
 
Left rubber cover out of position, 
left rubber holder slightly bent 
Rubber clamping plate and 
- rubber holder replaced 
 
 
One chisel missing One chisel replaced  
Gap between tiller unit, right and T-
beam 
Screw connections tightened




Immediately after the detonation of the third DM21 AT-mine, the damaged components 
of the tiller unit were replaced by new ones. Since the mines detonated within reach of 
the tiller drums, damages only occurred to the protective plates. 
The repairs were executed by 3 to 5 people, taking up about 5 h. 
The presence of a crane and a forklift truck is needed during the repair process (this 
was not always possible during the trials). 
Note: The manufacturer guarantees that during clearing of metal cased mines with up to 
7 kg TNT, detonation will not cause significant damages. Significant damages are 
defined as damages which cause repairs taking up more than 2 man-days. 
  
See annex 4 pictures 19 to 22 
 
 




Damages after trial 4 see annex 4  photo 32 
(Detonation of AT-mine TM 62 P3) 
Damages Reparation See picture 
Right side plate, tiller end ripped off and 
catapulted away. 
Replaced 23 
Side plate 3 mm Niro, right, ripped off and 
catapulted away. 
Replaced 24 
Levelling / depth feeler right, ripped off and 
catapulted away. 
Replaced  
All screw connections of the components 
mentioned before were mostly  warped or 
ripped off 
Replaced 25 




Damages after trial 5 to 8 see annex 4  photo 33 
(Detonation of TM 62 P3 AT-mine, no full mine detonation, merely fuse with small 
amount of leftover explosive detonated) 
 
No visible damages to the device were observed.  
 
Damages after trial 9 see annex 4  photo 34 
(Detonation AT-mine TM 57) 
 
Damages Reparation See photo 
Right side plate, tiller end partially ripped off  Side plate can be further used, screw 
connections had to be replaced 
26 
Side plate 3 mm Niro, left, partially ripped off. Side plate can be further used, screw 
connections had to be replaced 
27 
Levelling / depth feeler left, partially ripped 
off and strongly warped. 
Lever had to be repositioned, screw 
connections had to be replaced. 
 
Rubber, middle, lifted Rubber repositioned, no further repairs 
needed. 
 
Rubber left, ripped off. Rubber supports still present, rubber had 





5.4 Vibration measurements  
The results of the vibration measurements conducted by WTD 41 were subjected to 
human relevant evaluations by WTD 91. The human relevant evaluation is part of the 
WTD 41 report present in annex 3. 
5.5 Activities WTD 41 
As expert of the mine clearance tank KEILER, the WTD41 experiences during the 
detonation of life AT-mines had to be integrated. The results and evaluation have to be 
taken from the WTD 41 report in annex 3 . 
5.6 General Observations 
1. The mini-measurement connection devices present on the MINEBREAKER are 
not compatible with those normally used in the German Army; adapters are 
needed. 
2. The front panel of the driver cabin is damaged and needs to be replaced. 
3. The locking chain on the entrance ladder must be continuously fixed. 
4. Hydraulic pipes of the hydraulically powered tiller drums, which heat up during the 
operating process, are positioned next to the ladder and contact with the ladder 
cannot  be excluded. Therefore, these pipes should be covered (see annex 4  
photo  35). 
5. Rubber cover flaps over the tiller drums should not move up during operation of 
the tiller. They always should positioned back into the starting position. 
Constructive measures are needed (see annex 4 picture 36). 
6. Frequent breaking occurs to the tiller chisel shafts. A correction of the chisel 
consistency is urgently needed.  
7. The  neutral position of the hand gear should lock discernibly (see annex 4 photo  
37). 
8. The tank hatch must be lockable. 
9. After the detonation of an ATM, a check for damages has to be carried out 
routinely. In case of tiller repair the use of a lifting device is necessary (crane, fork-
lift etc.) 
10. Hydraulic leakage at one coupling of the vehicle (in the driving direction, left) in 
front of the hydraulic cooler. In principle, all couplings have to be checked on 
impermeability before delivery.  
11. Hydraulic and air filter must be new at the delivery. 
12. Loss of liquid from the cantilever ((in the driving direction, left).Impermeability 
control before the delivery to the Bw. 
13. The spare parts produced and used by FFG were not always constructed well 
(screws were wrong or not present, side plates were wrongly drilled). Urgently 
needed tools are not present. The tool list needs  to be  revised by the 
manufacturer. 
 
14. During repair bolts must be taken out. Adequate tools for doing this are missing. 
15. During clearance the driver must be connected to the outside world by radio. The 
use of a manually operated radio creates lots of problems, since both hands are 
needed for the control of the joystick for driving, lifting and lowering the tiller unit. 
Therefore, a fixed radio installation inside the cabin with built-in loudspeaker is 
needed. 
16. Note: 
In case pressure drops, the brakes open and the vehicle cannot brake. Normally 
brakes close when the pressure drops and the vehicle is not functional. 
6 Summary 
During the trials with life AT-mines of different type and origin, the MINEBREAKER 
obtained a clearance result of 100%. 
 
The following mines were detonated by the MINEBREAKER: 
3 AT-mines    DM 21, 
1 AT-mine    TM 62 P3 and 
1 AT-mine    TM 57  
 
For  four TM 62 P3 AT-mines, the mine cases were tilled and only the fuses were 
initiated. These mines can also be considered as detonated. 
The driver is sufficiently protected, inside the vibration-proof cabin, against detonations 
of up to 7 kg TNT when taking place within the tiller unit area. 
The injury risks for the assessed body parts (breast, lumbar spine and lower leg) are 
very small, and are much below the allowable limit for mine protected vehicles as 
determined by the Federal Armed Forces. 
After each detonation, in particular after the detonation of AT-mines, the vehicle has to 
be checked for damages and has to be repaired if needed. 
When using the Minebreaker, enough spare parts of the various components of the tiller 
unit should be available. 
The damages that occurred during the trials are, according to the predefined definitions, 
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1 Task 
Mandated by WTD 51-230 and in the context of WTA: E/E510/20799/Q5204, the mine 
clearance device Minebreaker of FFG had to be deployed for the clearance of life AT-
mines, whereby the consequences of the detonations on the vehicle, as well as the 
physical and psychological impact on the driver, had to be assessed and evaluated. 
Vibration measurements and acoustic measurements of the impact of the explosion 
inside the driver cabin had also to be conducted, similar as the Swedish testing of three 
other mine clearance devices (according to the FMV-report of 25.10.01). 
The mine clearance device Minebreaker of FFG had already been deployed in June 
2001, in Meppen, for the clearance of partially armed blast surrogate mines (see picture 
annex 1). 
2 Schedule: 
23.05.02 Pre-discussion on WTD 51-230. 
18.06.02 Start of the planning. 
20.06.02  Pre-discussion about mine protection of the mine clearance device with 
WTD 91-410. 
25.06.02  Pre-discussion about the safety of the mine clearance device with WTD 
91-110. 
25.06.02 Reply to the task assigned by WTD 91-002-PK. 
08.07.02 Instruction of the participants carried out by Fa. FFG. 
09.07.02 Delivery of the mine clearance device „Minebreaker“. 
10.07.02 Task 20799/001received. 
10.07.02  Final endorsement of the safety parameters established by WTD 91-110. 
Authorization for the trials with life mines. 
12.07.02 Termination of the training. 
15.07.02 Transportation to the explosion test field Wohldhöhe. 
18.07.02 Preparation of the mine clearance device for MoD Scharping. 
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3 Pre-discussion on 23.05.02 
In a pre-discussion, the project leader of Fa. FFG, H. Kamper, presented the explosion 
trials conducted by the company in Baumholder and the results of operations in Bosnia 
and Korea. 
An EU- attestation of conformity for the safety of the vehicle for clearance of 7 kg mines 
was handed over. 
For the operation of the mine clearance device the following order was proposed: 
1. Fa. FFG personnel 
2. WTD 51 personnel 
3. Soldiers from Army Engineer School 
Everybody had to be instructed on the operation of the system two weeks in advance of 
the clearance trials in Meppen. 
The mines to be used were the same as the ones used for the clearance trials with 
partially armed mines, since their detonation behaviour was already known. 
1. AT-mine DM21 (with 4,5 kg COMP. B) 
2. AT-mine TM-62 P3 (with 6,5 kg TNT) 
 
Three + three detonations on the mine clearance device had to be obtained and their 
consequences analyzed. 
 
4 Instruction and Training: 
On 08.07.02 in total 11 participants were instructed by the project leader of Fa. FFG, H. 
Kamper about the construction and the experiences obtained with the mine clearance 
device Minebreaker. This took place in the auditorium. Ten manuals were handed over. 
The list of participants can be found in annex 2. 
The Minebreaker was built using a Leopard-1 chassis, but it became, due to the 
hydraulically-powered unit and the big tiller drum, a lot larger and heavier. 
In four working hours the mine clearance device can be disassembled from the chassis, 
reducing in this way its dimensions: 
Weight 50 t → 31 t 
Width 451 cm → 328 cm 
Length 11,5  → 8,0 m 
 
Each of the three parts of the tiller drum was connected with 12 pins. This connection 
could not withstand detonation of a 10 kg mine and was therefore doubled. 
The performance during operational field deployment of a mine clearance device is 
expected to be >= 1 ha for each working day, whereby the fuelling and maintenance 
process  is included. As for the Leopard 1, the diesel tank contains 940 l, which is 
consumed during 1 working day. 
  Annex 1 
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On 09.07.02 the mine clearance device Minebreaker was delivered in Meppen by the 
use of a commercial tractor (SLT). Instruction of the driver, as well as of the department 
assigned to carry out the trial was continued. 
Representatives of the shooting department of WTD 91-110, which still had to give their 
approval to the manned trials planned to start after 15.07.02, took also part in the 
training. 
From 09.07.02 (13:00) to 11.07.02 (16:00), more personnel of WTD 41 and 51 and 
army soldiers were instructed on the operation of the mine clearance device and trained  
in the field, in front of the horseshoe bank. 
In total six partially armed blast surrogate mines DM21 (WITH 100 G s.p.) were used in 
order to acquire further figures on detonation, next to the results obtained from the 
clearance trials with partially armed mines, carried out in June 2001. Fiveof these mines 
were detonated without problems. A blast surrogate mine was apparently not detonated 
and rolled out of the test lane. 
The 100 g S.P. mine had not been activated through the fuse chain of the MIZ DM1001. 
This problem had already been assessed and was therefore already known. The trial 
was repeated and failed again. The mine body rolled at first 2x3 m in front of the tiller 
drum and after that disappeared completely in the tiller tracks. 
The search process using prodders found the mine body, its cover, and fuse, separated 
one from each other within a distance of 3 m. The fuse had initiated, and therefore was 
counted as a clearance success. 
But it must also be considered that even larger mine fragments could get through the 
mine clearance device. 
After further discussions between the participants on 10.07.02, a note on the safety 
measures was endorsed, and as such the clearance of life AT-mines was authorised 
(see annex 3). 
On 12.07.02 the mine clearance device was loaded on the SLT tractor and fuelled. After 
2 days of training and deployment (without clearance capacity), the vehicle was fuelled 
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5 Clearance trials with  life AT-mines 
5.1 Trial specifications 
The clearance trials with life mines took place from the 15.07.02 to the 19.07.02 on the  
demolition area at Woldhöhe in front of bunker 2. 
The AT-mines had been distributed in the middle of 8 m wide and 20 m long lanes and 
were covered with about 5 cm of earth. Their position was marked with stakes. For the  
life clearance trials the following measurements were executed: 
1. Video recording of the vehicle from outside; 
2. Video recording from the inside (head of the driver); 
3. Acoustic measurements of the explosion impact inside (next to the head); 
4. Measurements of the acceleration at the feet and the driver seat; 
5. Photographs of the damages to the mine clearance device. 
 
5.2 Used AT-mines 
Initially, it was planned to use the DM21 and TM-62 P3 AT-mines only, since their 
explosion behaviour was known. 
Three AT-mines DM21 (with new fuse chain) functioned effectively with the mine 
clearance device. 
One AT-mine TM-62 P3 exploded under the pushing frame and caused large damage
  
On 18.07.02, one DM21 and one TM-62 P3 without fuse were tilled, in order to give the 
opportunity to the Bw dog training centre to search with their explosive detection dog. 
The dog also found the remaining TNT-parts,originated from the tilled TM-62 P3. 
Because for four more of the tilled TM-62 P3 (with MIZ) only the fuse detonated, a third 
mine type had to be deployed during the last trial day: the TM-57 AT- mine. It has a 
steel case and is therefore more stable. 
During the pre-trial the first MWS-57 immediately detonated (no time delay) and could 
not further be used. 
For the she second mine the detonator time delay was short and the mine was 
detonated on the tiller drum during the clearance process, causing another large 
damage to the vehicle. 
 
Total consumption Mines Fuses 
  4x  DM21  3x  DM1001 
  6x  TM-62 P3  5x  MWP-62 
  1x  TM-57  2x  MWS-57 
   
5.3 Clearance trials with AT-mines DM21 
On 15 and 16.07.02 the mine clearance device Minebreaker was deployed for the  
clearance of three life AT-mines DM21, after waiting about 8 min. to unlock. 
  Annex 1 
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Trial 1  on 15.07.02 at 15:30 (driver: Kasischke, Fa, FFG): 
Mine detonated through contact  
Mine exploded at the centre of the tiller drum. 
Small damages to the vehicle. 
All measurements failed due to the stopping and restarting of the engine, 
since the measurement devices  were  connected to the 24V power system 
of the vehicle. For the next trials, batteries were used instead.  
 
Trial 2  on 16.07.02 at 10:40 (driver: Kirfel, WTD 51): 
Mine detonated through contact 
Mine exploded at the centre right 
1 rubber cover ripped off (was replaced) 
1 support ripped off 
pipes on the upper part were heavily bent 
Inside video recording failed due to a relay-mistake  
The next trial needed 2 clearance runs, since the driver missed the planned course and  
deviated to the left. He followed, instead of the middle marking, the left stake of the test 
lane borders. In this way, an AT-mine was missed, but hit by the right height feeler. The 
mine was re-positioned in relation to the mine clearance device location. 
 
Trial 3  on 16.07.02 at 14:30 (driver: Gewald, army): 
Mine detonated through contact. 
  Mine exploded at the centre of the tiller drum.  
The driver had still bent to the side and to the front. shortly before the 
detonation  
More damages to the vehicle after the 3rd mine detonation. 
 
Therefore it was decided not to clear any further DM21 AT-mines, but to repair the mine 
clearance device for clearance of the next mine type TM-62 P3.  
Using a crane and a fork lift, the bent upper edge was replaced and the ripped off 
rubber cover reattached. Apart from the larger spare parts, screws and bolts were also 
needed. 
The repair of the middle part of the tiller drum, damaged by 3 mine explosions, lasted 
from about 15:00 to 12:30 of the next day; that is about 5 hours with 2 experts and other  
people helping.  
 
5.4 Clearance trials with AT-mines TM-62 P3 
On 17.07.02 the mine clearance device Minebreaker was deployed with life AT-mines 
TM-62 P3 after 15 minutes of waiting time. 
  Annex 1 
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Trial 4  on 17.07.02 at 13:30 (driver: Lang, WTD 41): 
The tiller drum hit a buried mine at the centre right. It moved the mine about 
2 m forward with the tiller drum after which it was initiated at the right lateral 
part. 
The detonation on the right lateral part caused considerable damages: 
Side part (stainless steel) thrown 5 m to the left, 
Red steel part thrown 30 m to the left, 
Red steel part thrown 40 m to the front, 
Height feeler thrown 150m to the right. 
 
All thick screws on the side were torn off, the remnants had to be drilled out. Screws, 
bearings etc. had to be obtained. For this reason the repair process took about 5 hours. 
During this period the mine clearance device was transported with the help of the SLT 
tractor to the demolition area Huentel, in order to present it to the Defence minister on 
the 18.07.02. During the presentation the right height feeler was missing. 
After that, 2 mine bodies without fuse were cleared with the tiller drum, in order to 
deploy an explosive detection dog from the Bw dog training centre. 
The DM21 AT-mine was moved in front of the tiller several times and rolled out of the 
test lane. The mine hit the tiller drums so many times that it most probably would have 
been initiated. Finally, the mine was buried in the tilled track. 
The TM-62 P3 AT-mine was tilled after a few meters; some TNT-fragments were visible 
in the sand in the tiller track.  
The explosive detection dog covered the lane twice and located the fresh TNT-
fragments. 
  
Trial 5  on 18.07.02 at 14:45: 
The mine was tilled after 1 m and was flung before the earth berm, the 
plastic cover had been partially ripped off, and the TNT partially crushed, 
with the fuse still in it. Only after a further three clearance runs the fuse 
detonated inside the empty mine case. 
Clearance success, but no valuable information for the effect. 
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Trial 6  on 18.07.02 at 15:25: 
Shortly after hitting of the tiller drum by the mine, a stronger explosion was 
heard. It was, however, only the detonation of the fuse and some TNT-
fragments.  Additional TNT-fragments were found inside the ground. 
 
Clearance success, but no valuable information for the effect. 
 
 
Trial 7  on 18.07.02 at 15:55 
The mine was tilled out of the ground after 2m, and then buried inside the 
ground again. No reaction was either seen nor heard. The search process 
indicated that the mine body had been tilled so much before initiation of the 
fuse, that all its TNT had been dispersed in the ground. 
 
Clearance success, but no valuable information for the effect. 
 
Trial 8  on 19.07.02 at 10:40: 
The mine was tilled out of the ground after 2 m, and then buried inside the 
ground again. a stronger explosion was heard which was, however, only the 
detonation of the fuse and some TNT-fragments.  Additional TNT-fragments 
were found inside the ground. 
Clearance success, but no valuable information for the effect. 
 
After four consecutive unsuccessful trials (with regard to the evaluation of the effect) no  
more TM-62 P3 with plastic cases were deployed. AT-mines TM-57 with steel cases 
were used instead. 
 
5.5 Clearance processes with AT-mines TM-57 
On 19.07.02 the last trial with a TM-57 AT-mine was executed. The latter mine has a 
steel case and keeps the explosive better together until the initiation of the fuse. 
There was no need for a waiting time, because the MIZ MWS-57 was armed in less 
than 1 min and the mine clearance device was 10 m in front of it, corresponding to more 
than 2 min. 
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Trial 9  on 19.07.02 at 11:15 (driver Kölzer, WTD 51): 
Mine detonated through contact. Mine exploded at about 60 cm from the left 
end of the tiller drum. 
The explosion was first visible behind the drum, because of the amount of 
earth present in front of the tiller drum.  
The detonation near the left side caused considerable damages: 
Ripped off side supports  
Bent height support  
 
Since almost all the screws had been ripped off again from the side supports and 
therefore had to be removed, and since the bent side parts also would have had to be 
repositioned, the trials were suspended for that day as the repairs would have been too 
time-consuming. 
 
The testing of the mine clearance device Minebreaker was therefore concluded and the 
device was loaded on the commercial tractor SLT. On 22.07.02 it was sent back to the 
manufacturer Fa. FFG for repair. 
 
5.6 Remaining  mine fragments 
On the Wohldhöhe, 4 life DM21 AT-mines were used.  
3 mines with fuse detonated. 
1 mine without MIZ, deployed only for the use of explosive detection dogs, was dug out 
from the earth berm created in the clearance track. The mine had been hit several times 
by the tiller drums and COMP. B had been set free. No mine parts were missing and the 
mine body was destroyed later on. 
On the Wohldhöhe, 6 life AT-mines TM-62 P3 were used. 
Only one mine with MIZ MWP-62 detonated. The other 5 mines with green plastic cases 
were mechanically broken, even if for 4 mines with MIZ the mine fuse was still initiated.  
The reason for the lack of detonation was that the explosive had already been smashed 
into pieces and didn’t come into contact with the fuse. 
The terrain was searched at the 5 locations and almost half of the fragmented TNT was 
found. The other half had been buried deep in the soil..  
Finally 1 more life TM-57 AT-mine was deployed, which detonated properly. 
 
6 Measurements during the clearance process 
6.1 Video recording of the mine clearance device 
The external video-recording of the mine clearance device was carried out by the WTD 
91-230. The monitor was put in a protective case about 30-50 m next to the lanes to be 
cleared and viewed the left side of the clearance device. 
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On the tape from 06.08.02, mine bodies inside the earth berm are visible and during the 
detonations single detached parts can also be discerned 
6.2 Video recording of the driver 
The video recording of the operator inside the driver cabin was executed by WTD 91-
250 and is contained on the above cited tape. 
For the installation of the video camera see annex 6. 
Depending on the preparation by the operators for the detonation, they were shaken 
more or less tempestuously. All 5 drivers declared that the impact experienced by the 
mine detonations on the mine clearance device was absolutely bearable. 
 
6.3 Explosion impact on the driver 
The measurements of the explosion impact at head height of the operator in driving 
position were executed by WTD 91-630 (installation of the explosion impact recording 
see pictures annex 6). During the first trial, no measurements were carried out. After 
switching the voltage supply of the recording devices from the vehicle supply switched 
to a 24 V battery 4 measurements were recorded. 
 
The values of the measurements were very variable, depending more on the location of 
the explosion than on the volume of the mine. The highest values amounted to 145-153 
dB, the duration of the effect to 28-33 ms. During deployment of the tank cover H-280 at 
least 34 occurrences a day are bearable, and with ear protection Max-Lite at least 826 
detonations. 
For single results see annex 4. 
 
6.4 Acceleration measurements 
The acceleration measurements on the driver cabin floor, next to the operator feet and 
on the seat were executed with the administrative assistance of WTD 41-150. 
Installation of the acceleration recording equipment: see photos in annex 6. 
2 AT-mines DM21, detonating in the centre of the operator’s seat pillow caused 
accelerations of 3,5 x 4000 ms and 2,2 g x 100 ms. 
Outcome of it is a DRI-value of about 4,0 (limit value 15), which implies that the 
probability for a backbone injury is very low. For the AT-mines TM-62 P3 and TM-57 
even lower values were obtained for the z-axis, probably because these detonations did 
not occur in a central position. 
On the floor, peak acceleration figures of about 5 g (limit value 20 g ) were measured. 
Hence, also the probability for a lower leg injury can be excluded. The evaluation of the 
WTD 41-150 measurements was executed by WTD 91-460. 
The report of 05.08.02 is attached as annex 1. The comments presented in section 4  
concerning detonation under the equipment main body are completely excessive; see 
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report on  safety in annex 3. The information on trials with a detonation under the chain 
is instead justifiable, since this case can be defined as a real injury probability. 
This type of trial should be planned using a proper measurement technique. A trial 
opportunity could arise when after deployment of the MInebreaker in Afghanistan, it 
needs to be submitted to a comprehensive overhaul process. 
6.5 Photo Documentation of the damages 
The WTD 91-250 department, assigned to take pictures, was instructed by the WTD 51-
230 project leader to take in total 120 pictures, in order to document the trials and the 
resulting damages to the mine clearance device. 
In this report, only 5 x 3 pictures are given as examples of the damages inflicted to the 
vehicle after the detonation of 5 AT-mines, see annex 6. 
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For the pictures refer to the original German document, also available in the ITEP reports database 
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1. Task 
In July 2002 (week 28. and 29.) trials were executed at the WTD 91 with the mine 
clearance device Minebreaker of FFG Cie. The clearance of mine obstacles was 
simulated, whereby AT-mines were used. During 4 trials, acceleration measurements at 
the driver seat position took place, in order to evaluate the impact of a mine explosion 
on the driver. On the driver seat and on the floor panel between the driver’s feet, an uni-
axial vibrations feeler was installed (Z-direction). The measurement data had to be 
assessed with regard to the consequences for human beings, according to the German 
Federal Forces regulations for mine protected vehicles. 
2. Execution and Evaluation criteria 
4 trials were executed with the integrated measurement system, two of them with  ATM 
DM 21 (5,6 kg TNT), one with an AT-mine TM 57 (6,5 kg TNT) and one with a TM 62 
(7,6 kg TNT). The mines detonated in the area of the mine clearance device, that is, not 
under the chain or under the vehicle. 
The acceleration on the seat was measured uni-axial in the Z-axis direction. The  
acceleration present in this position has, first of all, an impact on the  breast and lumbar 
spine of the driver. For the impact evaluation with regard to the backbone injury 
probabilities, the “Dynamic Response Index” is used (DRI), in which the backbone is  
described as a spring-compound-damper system. As input parameter, the duration of 
the acceleration in Z-axis direction is applied. Using the latter input parameter the 
backbone deformation and therefore the injury probability in Z-axis direction, is then 
determined. The injury probability according to the German Federal Forces regulations 
for mine  protected vehicles, is not allowed to exceed the 5%. 
The acceleration present at the driver’s feet was measured using a feeler placed on the 
floor panel of the driver cabin. For the evaluation of the injury probability at the driver’s 
lower legs, the measurement data are not fully appropriate. The criterion that needs to 
be applied for mine protected vehicles is the “Lower Leg Threshold”, where a maximum 
allowable force on the lower leg is attributed a certain allowable exposure time. 
In the present case the acceleration was measured instead of the force. Furthermore, 
the measurements were taken not at the lower leg, but on the floor of the driver cabin, 
and not under one foot, but in between both feet. Since the acceleration transmission 
mechanism from the floor panel to the feet cannot be precisely determined (e.g. 
unknown damping characteristics of the footwear etc.), only an estimation of the injury 
risks can be provided. 
Next to the measurement values, also the personal impression of the drivers were taken 
into consideration for the final assessment. 
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3. Results and Evaluation 
3.1 Impact on the backbone 
Pictures 1 to 4 show the vibrations present in the seat pillow and the calculated 
deflections on the backbone. 
  
 
Picture 1: DRI-course Z-axis direction, Mine DM 21 (trial 1) 
 
   
Picture 2: DRI-course Z-axis direction, Mine DM 21 (trial 2) 
 
 
Picture 3: DRI-course Z-axis direction, Mine TM 57 
 
  
Picture 4: DRI-course Z-axis direction, Mine TM 62 
For the pictures refer to the original German document, also available in the ITEP reports database
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Measurements were executed only for the z-axis direction, and not for the other two 
interested directions,.As in case of mine impact, the z-axis direction represents always 
the most critical direction of impact, the present data allow for an estimate of the injury 
risks. The vibrations chart for the trial with the TM 57 mine clearly indicates an incorrect 
measurement. In particular, the sudden jump to 200 ms seems unreliable. Probably, for 
this trial a failure occurred during the recording of the vibration. As a result, no DRI-
value can be determined for this specific case. Presumably, the loading will be 
compared with those of other trials. 
 
In all other cases, the calculated injury probability lies around 0,1%, that is, much under 
the maximum allowable value of 5 %, for mine clearance devices. On the basis of the 
on average low maximum vibration values, also in case of higher degrees of loading, it 
can be concluded with high confidence that no permanent damages in the breast and 
lumbar spine area are developed. According to the Impact Ride Quality Index (IRQI), 
realised by PAYNE, and based on the DRI, up to 20 loadings with values of an order of 
magnitude of the ones recorded in the present trials are not possible. 
 
3.2 Impact on the lower leg 
 
Picture 5 shows the vibrations measured in between both feet. 
 
 
Picture 5: Courses of vibrations in the foot area (Z-axis direction) 
For the picture refer to the original German document, also available in the ITEP reports database 
 
As mentioned before, only limited conclusions can be drawn about the real impact on 
the lower leg of the driver from the executed measurements. Indeed, the lower leg 
vibration is going to be lower than the acceleration directly measured on the floor panel, 
since e.g the damping created by the footwear has to be taken into consideration. 
In general, an acceleration of up to 20g in terms of a single lower leg impact, 
independently from the impact duration, is considered as not critical. The values 
measured in z-axis direction, and shown in picture 5, indicate that the resulting  
acceleration in the lower leg area does not exceed this limit value. This observation is 
also confirmed by the driver, who confirmed that the impact on the feet and lower leg 
was barely noticeable.  
An injury in the lower leg area of the driver can therefore, also in case of multiple 
loadings, be excluded with high confidence. 
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4. Conclusion 
The Minebreaker driver cabin offers enough protection against the detonations of DM 
21, TM 57 and TM 62 AT-mines, if they detonate inside the area of the mine clearance 
device. The injury risks for the analyzed body parts (breast, lumbar spine and lower leg) 
are very low and  are much under the limit values adopted for mine  protected vehicles 
by the German Armed Forces. The driver’s impressions coincide with this analysis. 
A detonation of a mine under the vehicle main body is not probable due to the way of 
working of the Minebreaker during the clearance process: mines are detonated or 
broken up by the tiller unit.  If a mine would roll away from the mine clearance device, it 
would most likely detonate under the tracks, or next to the device. The effects of a 
detonation occurring under the tracks of the Minebreaker can not be assessed based  
on the present measurements. It can be, however, assumed that, in this case, critical 
impacts could be generated.  If, for any reason, a detonation occurs under the vehicle, 
fatal consequences for the driver could be assumed, since the Minebreaker is only 
based on the Leopard chassis 1 without any specific protection. 
It is therefore recommended that that the effects of detonation in the track area and 




















For the pictures refer to the original German document, also available in the ITEP reports database 
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1.  Check-up before the start 
 
Check that all the levers, switches, potentiometers are positioned on “0”  
Check that the speed controller is “switched off”, the potentiometer at stop position left and the safety 
switch control lever (right of the driver’s position) is pressed. 
 
2. Starting the engine 
 
 Put the main switch in position 2 
Press the Reset switch 
Press the test light switch 
Bring the control lever in the middle position (blue light switches on) 
Allocate control lever 
Put “Engine switched on” lever in position 1 and hold it until spiral-wound filament glow. 
Put “Engine switched on” lever in position 2 and at the same time press “engine switched off” switch for 10 
seconds. 
Release “engine switched off” lever (engine starts) 
Switch on speed controller 
Adjust engine speed to at least 1100 u/min. 
  
3. Driving with the MINEBREAKER 
 
Put functioning lever on position 1 (cruising speed) 
Wait until a hydraulic oil temperature of approx. 30 degrees is reached  
Increase engine speed to 1500 U/min 
Press safety switch next to the control lever 
Run the device with the operating handle 
 
  
4. Flailing with the MINEBREAKER 
 
Reduce speed engine on about 1100 U/min 
Put functioning lever on “working mode” 
Switch flailing lever on 1 “ unterschlächtig” 
Switch flailing potentiometer on maximum speed 
Adjust engine speed on 1800 up to 1900 U/min 
Switch driving device on 3 m/min (vehicle moves) 
Lower tiller slowly (with left lever by pressing to the front) 
Check height feeler and maintain level 
Adjust speed  according to the terrain and soil characteristics while lowering the tiller 
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5. End of flailing process 
 
Reduce speed to 1m/min and lift thereby the tiller slowly 
As soon as the tiller has been lifted and taken out of the soil, stop the vehicle 
Switch flailing potentiometer to position “0” 
Switch engine speed to about 1100 U/min 
Switch flailing lever on 1 “cruising speed” 
e.g. drive backwards out of the minefield 
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Lang Short Report 
      
1 Task description 
In the context of an urgent requirement, the mine clearance device Minebreaker from the 
Flensburger Fahrzeug Gesellschaft (FFG) had to be prepared for its deployment in Afghanistan. 
Prior to the deployment, the following clearance tests with  life  ATM’s had to be evaluated: 
 the effects of mine detonations on the vehicle’s crew and on the vehicle itself and 
 the clearance efficiency in the clearance mode  
The trials were executed in week 28 and 29 at WTD 91, managed by WTD 51. Because of their 
experiences with the  Mine Clearing Vehicle (MCV) Keiler in clearing of  life ATM’s, the WTD 41 
took part  in order to check and evaluate the process (WTA: E/E510/20976/Q5204). 
2  Tested Device 
The mine clearance device is a mechanical mine clearance system tasked to clear AP and AT-
mines. The vehicle consists of a prime mover– chassis Leopard 1 – with an adaptable tiller unit. 
The main part of the clearance unit is the hydraulically powered rotating tiller drum mounted at 
the front of the vehicle and fixed to the prime mover by two arms on the left and right side. In 
cruising and working speed the vehicle runs on ordinary diesel fuel hydraulically powered. 
The armoured driver cabin is attached to the prime mover’s roof and supported by 4 shock 
absorbers. 
The crew of the vehicle consists of one driver for cruising and working speed. 
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3 Evaluation procedure 
Activities during week 28: 
 Presentation of the vehicle  by the Flensburger Fahrzeugbau Gesellschaft 
 Discussion about  safety (WTD 91) 
 Operating instructions and clearance of 6 inert  ATM’s (DM21 with 100g explosive 
charge) 
 
Activities during  week 29: 
Clearance of life ATM’s with different crews. The mines were buried, in front of the vehicle, at a 
distance from each other of about 10 m. 
Used mines: 
  ATM DM 21, mine with steel case and about 5 kg of explosive 
  ATMTM 62 P3, mine with plastic case and about 6,5 kg of explosive 
  ATM TM 57, mine with steel case and about 6,5 kg of explosive 
 
The following measurements were carried out during the clearance processes: 
 Determination of the explosive impact (acceleration) on the driver seat and on the feet 
surface (Execution WTD 41, Evaluation of the measured results – human relevant 
assessment – through the WTD 91, ergonomics) 
 Measurement of the acoustic impact of the explosion (execution by WTD 91) 
 Constant video recording inside the driver cabin (execution WTD 91) 
The driver was in constant contact with the management body. 
Driver ear protection: Radio connection of Fa. FFG 
  
4 Results 
4.1  Operating instructions 
The correction of the vehicle’s moving direction in clearance mode, by the use of the 
potentiometer lever, requires a lot of practical experience. Furthermore, the clearance depth 
control through the depth feeler requires high attention  by the  operator. 
Therefore, a qualified and effective preparation of the operator is essential, in order to 
avoid operation errors during the clearance process 
4.2   Wear of tilling instruments (chisel spikes) 
During the instruction phase 10 to 15 chisels were replaced on the tiller drum after each 
clearance process (breaking of the attachment shaft, soil not clayey).  About 100 chisel spikes 
in total were replaced during the complete testing phase. A correction of the chisel consistency 
before deployment of the device to Afghanistan is therefore needed. 
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4.3  Clearance of life AT-mines 
Cleared AT-mines 
 
Date  ATM Mine detonated Damages to the 
vehicle 
Measurements of  
acceleration 
15.07.02 DM 21 yes Deformation protective 
compound (Spoiler) 
No measurements 
16.07.02 DM 21 yes Deformation protective 
compound (Spoiler) 
Measurement  o.k. 
16.07.02 DM 21 yes Deformation protective 
compound (Spoiler) 
Measurement o.k. 
17.07.02 TM 62 P3 yes Protective side plate ripped 
off from arm at the left. 
Measurement o.k. 
18.07.02 TM 62 P3 Mine body destroyed, fuse 
initiated 
No damages to the device 
(blast effect missing) 
No measurements 
18.07.02 TM 62 P3 Mine body destroyed, fuse 
with remaining explosive 
initiated 
No damages to the device 
(weak blast effect) 
No measurements 
18.07.02 TM 62 P3 Mine body destroyed, fuse 
initiated 
No damages to the device 




TM 62 P3 Mine body destroyed, fuse 
initiated 
No damages to the device 
(blast effect missing) 
No measurements 
19.07.02 TM 57 yes Protective side plate ripped 
off from arm at the right. 
(Error in measurements) 
 
 
4.3.1  Effects of the mine detonation on the vehicle crew (impact of explosions) 
The driver’s knowledge about the presence of AT-mines causes already a psychological  stress, 
which creates a negative influence on  his operational readiness. Therefore the main goal of the 
trial was to prove the safety with regard to the impact of the explosion (effect of the acceleration) 
and the acoustic impact at the driver position inside the cabin during mine detonation. 
The evaluation of the acoustic impact of the explosion was done by the experts of the acoustic 
department at WTD 91. 
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4.3.1.1 Subjective evaluation – Clearance process with ATM TM 62  
 (Trial  on 17.07.02, Operator: WTD 41 staff) 
Clearance process: 
The buried ATM was dug out by the tiller drum and carried through the rotating movement to the 
right steel guide rod. The fuse was hit and, at the same time, the mine detonated. The 
detonation caused the operator to be frightened. A vibration impact in z-axis direction was felt at 
the driver seat. In the feet area the vibration impact was not felt. The fear of a collision between 
body and installations inside the driver cabin did not exist. 
The acoustic impact of the explosion was not felt as critical thanks to the ear protection used 
and the short duration of the impact. 
The impact of the mine detonation (ATM TM 62 P3) felt inside the driver cabin was estimated to 
be reasonable by the operator. In case of mine detonations with similar blast impact as the TM 
62 P3 (reference mine) in front of the vehicle and in the vehicle’s clearance area, the protection 
of the vehicle itself as well as of the cabin is considered as sufficient  because of the blast effect 
in front of the vehicle no danger exists for the crew. 
In order to build operator confidence in the protection of the mine clearance device, life mine 
targets should be used during future training.  
 
4.3.1.2 Result of the human relevant evaluation done by WTD 91  
 (Acceleration impact on the driver seat and on the feet area, see annex) 
The probability of injury at the driver’s breast, lumbar spine and lower leg, caused by the 
incoming vibration in z-axis direction, have been evaluated in the seat area as well as at the feet 
area,  According to the Armed Forces mine protection criteria, the injury probability inside a 
vehicle in case of mine threat is not allowed to exceed the figure of 5%. 
The human relevant evaluation of the explosion impact, caused by the blast effect of the used 
mines (detonation in the tiller area of the vehicle), corresponds exactly to the impact felt by the 
driver on the driver seat. This subjective statement was confirmed by the evaluation of the 
measured results. The injury risk for the operator is very low or even zero, (calculated value for 
the injury probability = 0,1 %, limit figure 5%). According to WTD 91 (ergonomics) no permanent 
injury danger in the breast and lumbar spine is likely to occur due to the low acceleration 
figures, also in case of multiple impacts of the same force. According to the measured impacts 
an injury in the lower leg area can be excluded. 
 
  Annex 3 
 
4.3.2 Effects of the mine detonation on the vehicle  
 (Repairing expenses of the device’s protective compound) 
The installed protective compound of the device consist of a radially placed guide rod above the 
upper tiller area (made of 4 protective bars with attached sections of protected pipe) and 
protective plates on the right and left arms. 
The main utility of this protective compound is: 
 Reduce the blast and splinter effects on the vehicle and driver cabin. 
 Careful elimination of AP-mines and explosive remnants from the rotating circle of the 
tiller drum 
 Avoid that the dug out and undetonated or broken mines detonate outside of the 
clearance lane. 
 
The protective compound and the tiller drum are directly exposed to the blast effects. Already 
after the first mine detonation (DM 21, inside the test lane) the following damages to the 
compound above the tiller drum, were visible: 
 Deformation of the elimination bars and of the protected pipe bar sections (from time to 
time the pipes were also broken) 
 Breaking of the protection pipe supports 
 Damage (ripping) of the rubber covers and of the respective supports. 
The  replacement process of the protective bars and of the protected pipes requires a relatively 
large amount of material and time (about 10 men/hrs after 2 to 3 mine detonations of up to 5 kg 
TNT) and the deployment of determined lifting devices (cranes or recovery tank). 
The TM 62 and TM 57 AP-mines both detonated very close to the protective plates present on 
the left and right side of the device. In both cases the protective plates were heavily deformed 
and the screws on the arms (18 hexagonal head screw M16, strength category 8.8) were 
destroyed. In the upcoming repairing process (replacement of the protective plate), the removal 
of the screws remaining on the arm was difficult and took up a lot of time. 
Damages to the protective compound cannot be avoided due to the existing blast effect of 
detonating mines. Using constructive measures, such as implementing a more stable 
construction of the protective bars and pipes (tolerating up to 7 kg TNT), an  improved  
replacement procedure of the single components with proper instruments fitted on board (e.g. 
lifting device present on the vehicle), the preparation of the vehicle for re-deployment could be 
accelerated remarkably. 
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4.3.3 Clearance efficiency 
In total 9 life AT-mines were cleared. The DM 21 and TM 57 mines, both with steel cases were  
initiated during the clearance (danger risk excluded). For the plastic cased TM 62 mine type, a 
mine was initiated by simple contact with the right protective plate, the remaining mines were 
broken by the tiller and the corresponding fuses were detonated. 
Assessment:  The danger risk caused by the ATM at the trial area was no longer existent after 
the clearance process (the mines were either completely broken or their case was destroyed 
and the fuse initiated). In case of a deployment of the vehicle to mine-affected areas with 
unknown  mine threat,  a search phase for mine fragments and for remaining life fuses should 
be carried out. 
Further remark: The clearance efficiency of the Minebreaker was determined in June 2001 and 
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 Picture 1: Minebreaker in working mode 
 
 
 Picture 2: Tiller made of tiller drum with steel chisel 
 
For the pictures refer to the original German document, also available in the ITEP reports database 
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For the pictures refer to the original German document, also available in the ITEP reports database 
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 Picture 5: Driver cabin 
 
 




For the pictures refer to the original German document, also available in the ITEP reports database 
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For the pictures refer to the original German document, also available in the ITEP reports database 
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 Picture 9 and 10: Deformed protective bars and damaged protective pipes 
 
 
 Picture 11: Replacement of the protective bars and the protective pipes 
 
 
For the pictures refer to the original German document, also available in the ITEP reports database 
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For the pictures refer to the original German document, also available in the ITEP reports database 
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Picture 14 and 15: Tiller unit after the clearance process of ATM TM62 P3. 





For the pictures refer to the original German document, also available in the ITEP reports database 
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Picture 16 and 17: Deformed and ripped off protection plate (left one). Position in which 





For the pictures refer to the original German document, also available in the ITEP reports database 
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WTD 51 Koblenz, 21.08.2001 
Dept 230 
Mine Clearance Device - Samples 
Project Nr.: 10536 
TRAR Theimer Pictures 
refer to original German document, also available in the 
ITEP reports database 
















TRAR Theimer Pictures 
refer to original German document, also available in the 
ITEP reports database 















T- beam ripped off with 
chisel drum holder  
TRAR Theimer Pictures 
refer to original German document, also available in the 
ITEP reports database 
Page 3 of 13 
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WTD 51 Koblenz, 21.08.2001 
Dept 230 
Mine Clearance Device - Samples 











Screw connections, pipe 
support, short, and pipe 





middle rubber cover 
TRAR Theimer Pictures 
refer to original German document, also available in the 
ITEP reports database 














Trial 2 screw connections 
ripped off 
TRAR Theimer Pictures 
refer to original German document, also available in the 
ITEP reports database 




Trial 2 right rubber cover 
missing 
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WTD 51 Koblenz, 21.08.2001 
Dept 230 
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Trial 2 left cover covering 
raised 
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Trial 3 bent T- beam with 








Trial 3 gap between tiller 
unit right and 1st T- 
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pipes after 3 detonations 




Repair process: replaced 
components 
  Annex 4 
 
WTD 51 Koblenz, 21.08.2001 
Dept 230 
Mine Clearance Device - Samples 
Project Nr.: 10536 
TRAR Theimer Pictures 
refer to original German document, also available in the 
ITEP reports database 









Repair process with 
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Trial 4 ripped off screw 
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Trial 9 torn out side plate 
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trial 8 (only fuse with  
leftovers of explosive 
detonated) 
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Hot hydraulic conduction 








Joystick inside the driver 
cabin 
 
